

OXO-1151

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3 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief/DPD

THROUGH: Assistant Chief/DPD *Joe R*

SUBJECT: OXCART/KEYLOCK Security

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1. During a series of meetings held in Los Angeles during the week of 14 November 1960, consideration was given to procedures necessary to preserve OXCART (A-12) security as the KEYLOCK (AF-12) portion of OXCART develops. Personnel representing Headquarters USAF, Wright Field, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (LAC) and Hughes Aircraft Company (HAC), all of whom are to be participants in KEYLOCK were present. [REDACTED] represented [REDACTED].

2. Basis to these discussions, at least for purposes of security, was the assumption that KEYLOCK will be treated as a further development under Project OXCART, and as such, participants therein must possess an Agency clearance. Participants were identified as those who must know of the existence of an application for the HAC AGC-16 fire control system and GAR-9 missile.

3. After being informed of the security standards which will govern their participation, HAC representatives outlined their proposal for meeting those standards. Their proposal was considered by the interested parties and resulted in the following decisions.

a. HAC will identify persons in that organization who must be made aware of the existence of an application for their AGC-16/GAR-9 system.

b. This group, to consist of about 65 persons when fully staffed, will be installed in an area of the HAC plant sealed off from other activities.

c. Among this group, to be known internally as the Advanced Armaments Laboratory (AAL), will be the individuals responsible for engineering, system integration, contracts, finance, procurement and security. They will

function independently of their counterparts in EAC, to the extent necessary to protect knowledge of the AF-12 development, or more specifically, the fact that AUC-12/GAR-9 development efforts are being accelerated through supplemental funding.

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d. Among the personnel cleared for assignment to the AAI, there will be two levels of OXCART knowledge. The first will consist of about ten persons who must know the source of the [REDACTED] and the A-12 version of the aircraft. The remaining participants will be told only of the long range interception version. The latter will be represented to the second group as a top secret USAF development. This information will be known as the KNOLOCK briefing. It is intended that no one at Hughes be informed of the AI aspect of the A-12.

e. An "in-house" explanation for the creation of the AAI and the peculiar security restrictions pertaining thereto will be that EAC is embarking on various proprietary research efforts which they intend to conceal from the rest of the industry and that, incidentally, the AUC-12/GAR-9 work will continue there.

4. In the LAC context, the following action will be taken to provide a surface cleavage between the two versions.

a. An AF-12 engineering team will be identified who will have responsibility for integration of the EAC system. EAC personnel (with only the KNOLOCK clearance) will have contact only with the LAC AF-12 team. The AF-12 team will be briefed regarding the security distinctions between the A-12 and AF-12 programs.

b. The AF-12 team will have office and engineering space in Hangar 82 separate from the A-12 areas. The AF-12 mock-up will be installed in another separate area in Hangar 82.

5. At Wright Field the existing U-2 (CIA and FGE) support team, under the direction of Lt. Col. S. W. Brewer, has been expanded to provide for management of the USAF AF-12 program. This group, with one notable exception, will remain separate and apart from the Air Materiel Command/Air Research and Development Command normal organization. In effect this group becomes the AF-12 Weapon System Project Office (WSPGO), but retains its support roles in the U-2 and A-12 programs. The exception noted above is the

group of seven or eight individuals from the WADD Advanced Interceptor Armament NSPO, which in the past has been responsible for AGC-18/GAR-9 development. For command purposes this group will continue to respond to WADD, but functionally they will respond to the group headed by Lt. Col. Brewer. They will continue to occupy their present office space, which is apart from that in which Lt. Col. Brewer is located. This group, who will be GICANT briefed, will be expected to provide the insulation necessary to prevent other WADD personnel, who must continue certain technical supervision of the AGC-18/GAR-9 development, from becoming aware of an application for the system.

6. The entire KEDLOCK effort will be under the ultimate supervision of Col. Louis E. Andre who is responsible to Maj. Gen. Marvin G. Deimler, Director, A and D, Headquarters, USAF. Col. Leo P. Geary, as the USAF GICANT project officer, will be in a position to monitor KEDLOCK as it relates to GICANT and especially to GICANT security.

7. The preceding comments represent a rather cursory treatment of the GICANT/KEDLOCK security situation. As a result of the conferences between the GICANT/KEDLOCK participants, several significant security problem areas have been identified. The most formidable of these will be maintaining the distinctions between individuals possessing varying degrees of knowledge. With such persons present in each of the situations described, i.e., HAC, IAC and Wright Field, and the considerable interchange which will occur between them, the requirement for close monitoring of each situation becomes evident. Additional problems will result from the [redacted] of HAC and from the fact that at HAC and Wright Field we are assembling groups of people usually associated with long range interceptor development.

8. Our foremost objective becomes that of not permitting individuals in the "fringe areas" from becoming aware of the development of an advanced aircraft and even more important that there are two versions of the aircraft.

9. The security officers responsible for these various activities (HAC, IAC, and DFO) are now working together closely to insure that all parties involved know what is expected from them. In essence, procedures and standards peculiar to GICANT are being applied in the KEDLOCK effort.

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[redacted]
Chief, Security Section
HQS-ED/P

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